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There is a well-known similarity between the standard eco-
nomic approaches to the analysis of risk and of inequality. Judg-
ments on income distributions in terms of inequality can be analysed
using the same tools as judgments on a probability distribution
with monetary payoﬀs in terms of risk. The analogy between the
two lies at the heart of much of modern welfare economics. The
connection between the economic analysis of risk and the mod-
elling of individual utility under uncertainty is mirrored in the
relationship between inequality and social welfare. Moreover, in
many cases, the standard theories applied to the analysis of distri-
butions in either context suﬀer from the same sort of shortcomings.
This paper focuses on a particular diﬃculty that has long been
highlighted in the literature on risk and uncertainty, but which has
been neglected in the application of risk analysis to the problem
of making social choices when there is a concern for inequality.
The essence of preference reversals can be seen as a dysfunction
between diﬀerent aspects of the theory of choice — one that has
important implications for the way in which economic models of
choice under risk are applied. It could be that the same kind of
preference-reversal phenomenon that has been noted in a variety
of contexts involving risky choices also aﬀects situations involving
social choices among income distributions. A question that has not
been addressed hitherto is whether there is prima facie evidence
for this dysfunction in the ranking of income distributions.
In this paper we investigate whether the phenomenon of pref-
erence reversals, well established in the context of risk theory, also
applies when people make their decisions in the context of income-
distribution comparisons. We show how a suitable experimental
test may be constructed and discuss the results of running this ex-
perimental design in a number of countries. Section 1 provides an
overview of the preference-reversal issue as it has emerged in the
literature on risk and uncertainty and section 2 discusses the way
in which the issues translate to the welfare-economic analysis of
income distribution. Section 3 outlines our experimental approach
and Section 4 presents the main results.
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1 Background: Risk
The preference reversal (PR) phenomenon is well described by
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968).1 In their experiments, people were
asked to choose between two pairs of bets. In each pair, one bet
had a higher probability of winning (the “P bet”); the other oﬀered
higher sum to win (the “$ bet”). The results showed that when
the P bet was chosen, the $ bet often received a higher bid.2 The
results are not special to laboratory experiments: gamblers in a
Las Vegas casino were found to employ diﬀerent strategies when
choosing among pairs of bets than when attaching monetary values
to single bets (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983).
1.1 Explanations and persistence of PR
PR is widely documented in the psychology literature and to some
extent has been addressed by economists as well.3 Why might it
arise? A variety of reasons have been advanced that draw upon
both economics and psychology literature.
• Where real money is involved, incentives may have been mis-
specified.
• If there are substantial gains and losses then it is possible
that some apparent PR behaviour is in fact just a simple
income eﬀect. More subtly people may require more to give
up an object than they are willing to pay to acquire it — the
so-called endowment eﬀect (Thaler 1980).
• Preferences may be intransitive (Fishburn 1985, Loomes et al.
1991).
1Amongst many other previous contributions note particularly those of
Tversky (1967, 1969). See Seidl (2002) for a comprehensive survey.
2Although in our questionnaire study below the counterpart of the $ bet
is Lorenz-dominated by, and has a higher mean than, the counterpart of the
P-bet, the simple definitions of the two sorts of bet do not in general imply
that the $ bet has to be riskier in Rothschild-Stiglitz terms and have higher
mean than the P-bet.
3See in particular Slovic and Lichtenstein (1983) and the recent survey by
Seidl (2002). Roth (1991) describes experiments in which animals have been
observed to exhibit some choice anomalies of the same kind.
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• People can and do make inconsistent choices under uncer-
tainty and may be sensitive to the way a problem is presented
— the framing eﬀect (Davis and Holt 1993).
• A standard psychological argument focuses on the processing
the information contained in the lotteries: decision-makers
use one part of the information when they compare the lot-
teries, and another part when they determine their mone-
tary value (Safra et al. 1988). Indeed Slovic and Lichten-
stein’s own explanation was that in bidding the decision-
maker starts with a specific amount to win, and adjusts it
downward to account for other attributes of the bet. In the
choice problem there is no natural starting point. Thus the
amount to win dominates the bid decision but not the choice
decision.
Grether and Plott (1979) designed an experiment which con-
trolled for all the economic-theoretic explanations of the phenom-
enon, and found that PR persisted. They concluded:
In a sense the exception is an important discovery, as
it stands as an answer to those who would charge that
preference theory is circular and/or without empirical
content. It also stands as a challenge to theorists who
may attempt to modify the theory to account for this
exception without simultaneously making the theory
vacuous.
Pommerehne et al. (1982) and Reilly (1982) followed the Grether
and Plott (1979) design, motivated by skepticism of the PR phe-
nomenon and a belief that, examined under proper conditions, it
might disappear. Although the incidence of PR was somewhat
lower than that observed by Grether and Plott (1979), the phe-
nomenon could not be eliminated.
1.2 The preference model
PR belongs to broad class of findings that appear to demonstrate
preference patterns inconsistent with the axiomatic basis of Ex-
pected Utility (EU) — the standard model of decision-taking under
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risk.4 It is natural that there should be focus on the individual
axioms of EU that might drive the PR phenomenon.
Clearly intransitivity, noted above, could be a candidate ex-
planation. Furthermore PR could arise from violations of the in-
dependence axiom (Cox and Epstein 1989, Karni 1990): if the
independence axiom of EU is not satisfied, then the lottery choice
and the selling price elicitation decision are no longer separable as
would be the case in EU analysis (Holt 1986). In this context a
principal explanation for violations of the independence axiom, is
the anchoring phenomenon where a person’s judgments or deci-
sions are aﬀected by some reference level of income or wealth.
It is appropriate to consider whether some alternative to the
standard EU model could provide a coherent framework of choice
under uncertainty consistent with the PR phenomenon. For ex-
ample prospect theory suggests that people underweight outcomes
that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are
obtained with certainty (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This can
lead to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented
in diﬀerent forms.5
However Tversky et al. (1990) argue that PR cannot be ad-
equately explained by violations of independence, transitivity or
indeed the reduction axiom: rather the primary cause of PR is the
failure of “procedure invariance,”6 especially the overvaluing of
low-probability high-payoﬀ bets. Some reversals are explained by
scale compatibility, which implies that payoﬀs are weighted more
heavily in pricing than in choice.
Some, but not all, of these conclusions may be expected to
4The mechanism used for the preference reversal experiment will only elicit
the certainty equivalent in the case of EU (Karni and Safra 1987).
5Prospect theory predicts risk-averse behaviour in choices involving sure
gains, and risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. Furthermore people
may discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration.
According to the theory value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to
final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The
value function is usually concave for gains, convex for losses and is steeper for
losses than for gains.
6“Procedure invariance holds whenever the decision maker prefers a bet
B to a cash amount X if and only if the selling price for B exceeds X.” —
(Tversky et al. 1990).
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carry over to the income-distribution context.
2 Preference Reversals: Income Dis-
tribution
As we noted in the introduction, there is a link between the issues
concerning the private choice in the face of uncertainty and social
choice amongst alternative income distributions. The basis for this
link may be taken as one defined in purely formal terms — whereby
the structure of the mathematical model for one problem is grafted
on to the analysis of another — or one in which the same axiomatic
basis is used to characterise, for example risk and inequality — see
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971, 1973), Nermuth (1993). At a
deeper level one can model the choice between income distributions
as though an individual were making a choice amongst random
prospects behind a veil of ignorance as in Harsanyi (1955).
Of course policy makers and lay people may not make an ex-
plicit connection between the two types of analysis. They may
make reference to some concept of “inequality” in general but make
only a vague connection between it and risk or to other criteria
by which one might judge economic performance. However it is
reasonable to suppose that there could be some linkage between
the considerations that underlie the formulation of a utility func-
tion as a tool for appraising risky choices and the considerations
that underlie the application of a social-welfare function (SWF)
to the appraisal of unequal income distributions; at the least one
could posit that the same kind of ranking structures may apply to
both types of distributional problems. Given that a connection is
explicitly or implicitly made between rankings of income distribu-
tions and rankings of prospects, the issue arises whether the same
kind of preference-reversal is likely to be observed in situations
involving social choices amongst income distributions. If so there
may be important implications for the use of SWF analysis as a
guide for policy-making.
The issue can be expressed using standard approach in the in-
equality literature formalised by, for example, Atkinson (1970),
Kolm (1969) and Sen (1973). Consider the problem of compar-
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ing two income distributions F1 and F2. It is common to assume
the existence of an individualistic social welfare function W de-
fined on the space of income distributions that is endowed with
properties such as continuity, monotonicity, the transfer principle,
decomposability by subgroups. This, if appropriately specified,
forms the counterpart to the expected-utility function in the prob-
lem of choice under uncertainty. Clearly, the cardinalisation of W
is arbitrary and for this reason it is common practice to intro-
duce the equally-distributed equivalent income ξ of a distribution
F. This clearly is the counterpart to certainty-equivalent income:
ξ0 = ξ(F0) is that income which, if received by everyone in a per-
fectly egalitarian distribution, would yield the same level of social
welfare as W (F0) — see Figure 1.
So for two income distributions F1 and F2 one would regard
the statement
W (F1) ≥W (F2) (1)
as equivalent to the statement
ξ1 ≥ ξ2. (2)
Therefore, if one were able to pose a question as to the social
choice between two distributions and F1 were (hypothetically) cho-
sen rather than F2, one would expect there to be some revealed
valuation ξ1, ξ2 of the two distributions where ξ1 > ξ2
However could one conceivably find the contrary in practice?
If so, then the implied social-welfare version of the preference-
reversal phenomenon raises some interesting questions:
• Do people’s perceptions of income distribution violate the
continuity assumption required for the construction of the
equally-distributed equivalent income ξ?
• Do people perceive a priority of need?
• Would there be a special case if there were a large proportion
of the population at a subsistence income level?
• As in the case of experiments involving choices under uncer-
tainty, do people’s perceptions and/or choices violate the
6
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Figure 1: Relationship between equally-distributed income ξ and
mean µ for a distribution F : inequality aversion.
standard assumptions that are commonly made about the
social-welfare function W?
By analogy with the risk counterpart it is easy to see the pos-
sible importance of anchoring within the context of social judg-
ments. In this case we need some reference income that is perti-
nent in a social setting.
3 An Experimental Approach
In order to investigate the issues outlined in Section 2 we sought
a methodology that presented the choice amongst income distri-
butions within a context analogous to the experiments that had
been applied in the preference reversals literature.
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3.1 Experimental approaches in income distri-
bution
Over the last decade a substantial literature has developed on
questionnaire-experimental methods in the analysis of attitudes
to income distribution. This focuses on the use of short question-
naires administered in a controlled setting and typically combin-
ing both numerical and verbal responses. The general approach
is summarised in Amiel and Cowell (1999). The main thrust of
this has been to investigate the degree of support for key axioms
in the welfare-theoretic approach to income distribution. Some of
this literature has attempted a combined or comparative approach
to the related areas of risk and inequality — see Amiel and Cowell
(2002), Amiel et al. (2001) and Kroll and Davidovitz (1999).
A fundamental diﬃculty in the context of income distribution
concerns the involvement of the subject. In contrast to the exper-
imental work referred to in section 1 the majority of questionnaire
experimental studies place the respondent “outside” the setting
on which he or she is invited to pass judgment; however there are
some studies that have attempted to incorporate personal involve-
ment — see e.g. Beckman et al. (1994)
3.2 The experimental design
We formulated our inequality questionnaires in a similar way to
those that would have been presented in a risk context in the exten-
sive preference-reversals literature. It seemed to us that a partic-
ipatory experiment involving monetary rewards as outcomes was
not the most appropriate way to model issues whether the primary
focus is on social rankings and hypothetical social decisions.
Instead we designed a questionnaire experiment in which re-
spondents were invited to imagine making a choice between dis-
tributions while acting as representatives for others. The nature
of the choice is “distanced” from the individual by involving the
hypothetical group of other people. The questionnaire is designed
to reveal the way individuals would rank income distributions ac-
cording to social criteria if the choice were presented to them in
alternative formats. A combination of simple multiple choice and
8
numerical questions were used — see the Appendix for examples
of the types of questionnaires that were actually distributed. Ver-
sions in English, Hebrew and Spanish were provided for respon-
dents in appropriate locations where the questionnaire was run.
The Setting We posit a group of countries — Alfaland, Beta-
land, Gammaland — that all have the same mythical currency the
“Groat”.7 The reason for this slightly whimsical feature is as fol-
lows. To make the experiment operational we need to refer to
some type of unit of account; both to make sensible comparisons
of distributions and in order to express values that correspond to
bids something (apparently) concrete must be specified. However,
it is important that this unit of account does not have strong con-
notations with issues that lie outside the artificial experimental
world: so a well-known currency unit drawn from contemporary
experience is may not be appropriate. The groat (or its equiva-
lent in other languages) has a certain “once-upon-a-time” air to
it, although it is recognisable as a currency unit.
Because our questionnaires deal with income distributions, and
because we want to consider a rather simple concept of income
— that covers people’s basic needs with perhaps a surplus — we
considered only positive values for incomes.
Two of the countries have a simple income distributions char-
acterised by the triple (l, h, θ) — a proportion θ of the population
with low income l and a proportion 1− θ with high income h. Al-
faland is a higher inequality, higher income country than Betaland
(mean income in Alfaland and Betaland is 37 groats and 26 groats
respectively; Betaland Lorenz-dominates Alfaland) — clearly Alfa-
land is the counterpart of the $ bet and Betaland is the counterpart
of the P bet. Gammaland is a perfectly equal country: everyone’s
income is x groats, but x is not specified. See figures 2 and 3 for
a simple depiction.
7In the Hebrew translation this became the “Zuz” and in Spanish the
“Vinten” — in each case a currency that has some echo of real value from the
past, but does not carry any political baggage from the present-day world.
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The nature of choice Since our questionnaires concern income
distribution, respondents were asked about making social deci-
sions: these decisions involve a whole group of people rather than
just their own personal income or utility. Respondents were ini-
tially asked about Alfaland and Betaland in the following terms:
“You are the leader of a small community that is
considering a political union with one of the two coun-
tries. You expect that after the union the distribution
of income in your small community will be the same
as in the country you have joined.”
In presenting the question in this way we put the person in
the situation, but acting on behalf of others. The questionnaire
leaves implicit that the respondent represents the interests of the
community. However, the respondent is not invited to act as “big
brother” because the context of the question automatically in-
volves the person within the decision.
Furthermore the questionnaire is not directly about personal
likes or dislikes. In order to capture the element of social choice
amongst distributions (rather than personal preference amongst
distributions) we deliberately avoided the language of personal
valuation. Respondents were asked to consider the choices and
then indicate what they would decide rather than what they would
prefer.
Uncertainty A probability distribution was not explicitly de-
scribed in the experiment — indeed the wording of the scenario
made no reference to risk. However a probability distribution can
be seen as implicit in the description of Alfaland and Betaland.
The respondent was told “You are concerned about the commu-
nity, rather than about yourself”. There is no personal risk. The
person is told that θ percent of the group will get l groats and 1−θ
percent will get h groats.
Anchoring As we have seen in section 1.2 the choice between
distributions may be influenced by information concerning the
11
value of the monetary units. We allowed for this by introduc-
ing an “anchor” in the form of a specified level of income that is
considered to provide the basic needs for the inhabitants of any
of the three countries. No further explanation was given about
the nature of this basic needs income. It is not important for
the present study whether people interpreted this as an absolute
poverty line.
What is important is the perception of the distance of diﬀerent
groups in the income distribution for this reference point. To
control for the importance of this distance our experiments used
two diﬀerent values of Basic-Needs Income (BNI): 5 groats and 10
groats.
Two designs We also experimented with two diﬀerent versions
of the design in order to check for the possible influence of the
structure of the questions on the pattern of responses.
We went to the second design because of the order in which
Alfaland and Betaland were presented. In the first version for
question 2 (Alfaland) they could value it using a number higher
than 30; so in question 3 (Betaland) they might have wanted to
give a number higher than the previous one which might have ap-
peared to them as inconsistent — if they believe in monotonicity.8
3.3 The sample
During 1999 — 2001 the experiment was run with a combined sam-
ple of 1239 respondents — see Table 1. In each case the experiment
was run within class or lecture time and no preparation was given
to the student respondents about either the theory of choice under
uncertainty or the welfare economics of income distribution.
Roughly equal numbers were allocated to the two designs.
Within each design both high BNI cases (10 groats) and low BNI
cases (5 groats) were distributed. Respondents were not informed
that fellow respondents might have been completing a question-
naire diﬀerent from their own.
8As can be seen from the Appendix there were also other presentational
diﬀerences between the two designs — for example the depiction of Alfaland
and Betaland by boxes in design 2.
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Design 1 Design 2
Haifa 71 Ruppin 263
Bar-Ilan 35 Bonn 189
Fiji 224 E.Carolina 87
Ruppin 179 LSE 79
Cornell 12
Uruguay 100
621 618
Table 1: The Sample
3.4 Interpreting the responses
The choice question First we check those responses that give
categorical answers rather than a single real-number value. The
summary of the responses to question 1 are given on the left-hand
side of Tables 2 and 3.
This reveals information about tastes for redistribution and
is not the central focus of our study. However it is clear that in
both designs the B-responses (“choose Betaland”) dominate.9 The
diﬀerence between the designs in terms of the I-response (“toss a
coin to decide”) is readily explained once we look at the response
breakdown by participating institution in Tables 4 and 5.10 It is
clear that for some reason Israeli respondents are overwhelmingly
decisive in favour of A or B —few chose the option of indiﬀerence
between Alfaland and Betaland and the fraction choosing A is
quite similar to the fraction choosing B (contrary to Uruguay).
The valuation questions More interesting is the use of the
choice question in relation to the numerical answers on questions
2 and 3. The responses to the numerical questions correspond, in
9Note that the P bet was chosen more frequently also in previous work on
preference reversals reported in the risk literature.
10Here we have also broken the Ruppin subsample into two: Ru. Ec in
Tables 4 and 5 means just the regular economics students; Ru. EBA means
“Ruppin, Executive Business Administration” and forms a qualitatively dif-
ferent group from those of the economics students — they are older and have
more experience in management.
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eﬀect, to an implied “bid” for the egalitarian income distribution
in Gammaland
First, note that if people’s rankings over income distributions
conform to the axioms of underlying second-order distributional
dominance then this imposes bounds on the possible values of
income to be assigned to perfectly egalitarian Gammaland — see
figure 4. Second one may similarly apply bounds that indicate
consistency with first-order dominance.
3.4.1 Distributional dominance
In the light of this it is of interest to check those responses where
x < l or x > h for both x2 and x3 where l and h are the two given
income levels described on page 9; this is given by the numerical
answers to questions 2 and 3 respectively. A summary given in the
right-hand half of Table 2 (Design 1) and of Table 3 (Design 2):
remember that (a) the value of l is the same for both questions,
(b) the value of h diﬀers between the questions and (c) that the
h-values for questions 2 and 3 are interchanged between the two
experimental designs. Note that if there are such violations it does
not imply that a person is inconsistent or illogical. The person’s
views may simply not conform to the principle of monotonicity
that is often — but not always — applied in the welfare-economics
literature.11 Figure 5 illustrates indiﬀerence curves representing
preferences for the two types of violation.
It is possible that respondents may be influenced by the struc-
ture of the questionnaire and that this has contributed significantly
to the violations of monotonicity: for this reason we tried two dif-
ferent designs — see the discussion in section 3.2. However it is
clear that the violations of monotonicity are not just an artefact
of an ordering eﬀect in design 1: it persists in design 2.
11Violations of monotonicity are of course also well-known in the experimen-
tal literature on welfare economics — see, for example, Amiel and Cowell (1999,
pp. 64-66,119-120) and McClelland and Rohrbaugh (1978) in the context of
the Pareto principle.
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Figure 4: Second-order dominance bounds
Q1 Q2 Q3
Alfa land Betaland
A 157 25.3% x < l 34 5.5% 28 4.5%
I 38 6.1% x = l 59 9.5% 47 7.6%
B 403 64.9% l < x < h 482 77.6% 252 40.6%
NA∗ 23 3.7% x = h 19 3.1% 96 15.5%
621 x > h 14 2.3% 180 29.0%
NA∗ 13 2.1% 18 2.9%
*NA means blank or other response 621 621
Table 2: Distribution of Responses: design 1
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Q1 Q2 Q3
Betaland A lfa land
A 131 21.2% x < l 17 2.8% 15 2.4%
I 152 24.6% x = l 21 3.4% 24 3.9%
B 331 53.6% l < x < h 358 57.9% 510 82.5%
NA∗ 4 0.6% x = h 92 14.9% 22 3.6%
618 x > h 118 19.1% 27 4.4%
NA 12 1.9% 20 3.2%
*NA means blank or other response 618 618
Table 3: Distribution of Responses: design 2
Ru. Ec. Ru. EBA Haifa Bar-Ilan Fiji Cornell Uruguay
A 42.2% 27.3% 39.6% 65.7% 20.1% 0.0% 10.0%
I 2.0% 5.2% 2.8% 0.0% 57.1% 0.0% 3.0%
B 55.9% 67.5% 57.5% 34.3% 21.4% 100.0% 86.0%
NA 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 1.0%
Table 4: Responses by institution: design 1
Ruppin Bonn E.Carolina LSE
A 45.2% 2.1% 8.0% 1.3%
I 4.9% 52.4% 19.5% 27.8%
B 49.0% 45.0% 70.1% 70.9%
NA 0.8% 0.5% 2.3% 0.0%
Table 5: Responses by institution: design 2
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Figure 5: Violations of monotonicity
3.4.2 Preference reversals
The issue of preference reversals can be handled separately from
the question of consistency with dominance principles. The pro-
cedure is to identify those who answered A and who gave usable
responses on both Q2 and Q3 and then to partition them into
the separate cases x3 > x2, x3 = x2, x3 < x2 ; one then repeats
this for the B and I responses on question 1. It is appropriate to
distinguish between Strong Reversals and Weak Reversals.
Strong reversals are those where the pair of responses to ques-
tions 2 and 3 flatly contradict the choice indicated in the response
to question 1. In Design 1 this means responses where the person
indicated A on question 1 but then gave numerical values such that
x3 > x2, or the person indicated B on question 1 and then stated
numerical values x3 < x2. In Design 2 strong PR corresponds to
the reverse pattern.12
Weak preference reversals are made up of two types:
1. Where a strict preference for Alfaland or Betaland was ex-
pressed in question 1 but equal amounts were stated in ques-
tions 2 and 3.
12I.e. responses where the person indicated A on question 1 but then gave
numerical values such that x3 < x2, or the person indicated B on question 1
and then stated numerical values x3 > x2.
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2. Where indiﬀerence was expressed in question 1 but diﬀerent
amounts were stated in questions 2 and 3.
4 Preference Reversals: Results
The overall results by experimental design and gender of respon-
dent are given in Table 6. The rows are arranged, first according
to the possible responses on the straightforward choice question
(question 1) and then by the category of response when taking
into account the responses to questions 2 and 3. We classify these
by abbreviations as follows: SPR (strong preference reversal),13
WPR (weak preference reversal), NPR (no preference reversal);
the two SPR cases are highlighted in bold. It is clear that although
the proportion of A-type SPR responses (where the person chose
Alfaland on Q1) is small, the proportion of B-type SPR responses
(where the person chose Betaland on Q1) is substantial on either
design and for both gender groups. The gender issue is of interest
because in other experimental contexts there is a marked diﬀerence
between male and female respondents in terms of their support for
the transfer principle (Amiel and Cowell 2002). A simple χ2-test
shows that this diﬀerence in responses between males and females
is significant at the 5% level.
For some subgroups of the sample the low proportion of A-type
SPR responses is obviously attributable to respondents having in-
equality preferences such that very few chose Alfaland rather than
Betaland in question 1. But, as we have noted, this preference
pattern does not apply to the Israeli subgroups (Tables 4 and 5).
So it is interesting to note that even here the A-type SPR response
is low.14
By contrast the substantial showing of B-type SPR responses
is remarkable and in line with results from the literature on pref-
erence reversals in the risk context (the case of the “P bet”).
13Remember that where SPR is implied by x3 > x2 in design 1 it is given
by the opposite condition, x3 < x2 in design 2: see subsection 3.4.2 above.
14In the case of design 1 the proportions of these responses are:2% for
Ruppin Economics, 6.5% for Ruppin EBA, 10.4% for Haifa, 8.6% for Bar
Ilan; in the case of design 2: 6.5% for Ruppin.
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Design 1 Design 2
Q1 Q2,Q3 All Males Females Q2,Q3 All Males Females
A SPR x2<x3 4.7% 4.0% 5.5% x2>x3 2.8% 3.0% 2.7%
A WPR x2=x3 4.2% 4.7% 3.7% x2=x3 2.6% 3.0% 1.8%
A NPR x2>x3 16.4% 17.4% 14.9% x2<x3 15.0% 16.7% 14.0%
I WPR x2<x3 2.6% 2.4% 2.7% x2<x3 20.2% 24.7% 13.6%
I WPR x2>x3 1.9% 1.2% 2.7% x2>x3 2.1% 2.4% 1.4%
I NPR x2=x3 1.6% 1.6% 1.8% x2=x3 1.5% 2.2% 0.5%
B SPR x2>x3 26.9% 32.4% 22.9% x2<x3 26.7% 21.5% 34.4%
B WPR x2=x3 13.7% 10.7% 16.2% x2=x3 8.7% 9.1% 8.1%
B NPR x2<x3 24.3% 24.9% 24.7% x2>x3 16.5% 14.8% 18.1%
(NA) 3.7% 0.8% 4.9% 3.9% 2.7% 5.4%
N= 621 253 328 N= 618 372 221
Table 6: Responses by gender and design
Design1 Design 2
Q1 Q2,Q3 All C5 C10 Q2,Q3 All C5 C10
A SPR x2<x3 4.7% 5.3% 3.8% x2>x3 2.8% 3.2% 2.3%
A WPR x2=x3 4.2% 5.9% 1.9% x2=x3 2.6% 1.6% 3.6%
A NPR x2>x3 16.4% 18.2% 14.1% x2<x3 15.0% 18.1% 12.0%
I WPR x2<x3 2.6% 3.6% 1.1% x2<x3 20.2% 24.3% 16.2%
I WPR x2>x3 1.9% 2.5% 1.1% x2>x3 2.1% 1.9% 2.3%
I NPR x2=x3 1.6% 1.7% 1.5% x2=x3 1.5% 1.6% 1.3%
B SPR x2>x3 26.9% 23.5% 31.6% x2>x3 26.7% 23.6% 29.8%
B WPR x2=x3 13.7% 12.0% 16.0% x2=x3 8.7% 7.4% 10.0%
B NPR x2<x3 24.3% 22.6% 26.6% x2<x3 16.5% 12.6% 20.4%
(NA) 3.7% 4.7% 2.3% 3.9% 5.5% 2.3%
N= 621 358 263 N= 618 309 309
Table 7: Responses by BNI and design
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4.1 The “anchor”
As the discussion of the independence axiom noted (section 1.2)
the role of anchoring has been argued as a possible explanatory
factor for the preference-reversal phenomenon. In our case we used
the Basic Needs Income (BNI) as an anchor, in one case placing
BNI at the lower point of the simple income distribution. Table
7 reports the results for the two levels of BNI (labelled C5 and
C10 respectively), and compare how these two levels aﬀect the
decisions made by respondents. It is clear that the proportion of
Betaland-response SPR is slightly higher when the BNI level is
high (10 groats rather than 5 groats): again a χ2-test shows that
this diﬀerence is significant at the 5% level.
4.2 Conditional probabilities
Given that people’s preferences may diﬀer according to personal
attributes — gender, country of origin and so on — it is interesting
to see what the probability of a preference-reversal response is
conditional on a particular type of response to question 1 that
elicits information about distributional preferences.
The overall picture The summary results on these conditional
probabilities are presented in Tables 8 and 9. Again we see that the
welfare comparison experiment confirms the standard outcomes
from the preference-reversal literature: the probability of a strong
preference reversal conditional on selecting Betaland in the first
question (the counterpart to the P-bet) is much higher than the
probability conditioned on selecting Alfaland. This result holds for
both sample designs. However it does not hold for weak preference
reversals separately — here the conditional probabilities are about
the same for both types of question 1 responses.
Breakdown by University It is also clear that, with one ex-
ception (the Ruppin Executive Business Administration students),
the pattern of conditional probabilities is manifest across the dif-
ferent subsamples — see Tables 10 and 11. We can reasonably
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Whole “poverty line” subsample
Sample 5 groats 10 groats
Of those who chose Alfaland
SPR 18.5% 18.1% 19.2%
WPR 16.6% 20% 9.6%
Of those who chose Betaland
SPR 41.4% 40.4% 42.6%
WPR 21.1% 20.7% 21.5%
Table 8: Conditional probabilities of preference reversals: Design
1
Whole “poverty line” subsample
Sample 5 groats 10 groats
Of those who chose Alfaland
SPR 13.5% 14.1% 12.7%
WPR 12.7% 7.0% 20.0%
Of those who chose Betaland
SPR 51.4% 54.1% 49.5%
WPR 16.8% 17.0% 16.7%
Table 9: Conditional probabilities of preference reversals: Design
2
21
Ru. Ec. Ru. EBA Haifa Bar-Ilan Fiji Cornell Uruguay
Of those who chose Alfaland
SPR 4.7% 23.8% 27.5% 13.6% 25.6% 0.0%
WPR 0.0% 23.8% 5.0% 4.5% 32.6% 50.0%
Of those who chose Betaland
SPR 80.7% 9.6% 43.1% 33.3% 41.8% 33.3% 33.7%
WPR 7.0% 36.5% 15.5% 41.7% 23.4% 8.3% 22.9%
Table 10: Conditional probability of preference reversal (Design
1)
Ruppin Bonn E.Carolina LSE
Of those who chose Alfaland
SPR 13.0% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0%
WPR 11.3% 33.3% 14.3% 100.0%
Of those who chose Betaland
SPR 52.8% 60.5% 47.5% 38.9%
WPR 18.4% 7.4% 23.0% 20.4%
Table 11: Conditional probability of preference reversal (Design
2)
conclude that the distinctive B-type versus A-type contrast in the
conditional probabilities is not an artefact of the diﬀering views
about the inequality-mean income trade-oﬀ that are displayed by
diﬀerent sample subgroups.
4.3 Regression Analysis
In order to investigate the determinants of preference reversal be-
haviour consider a simple regression model using the personal char-
acteristics and information about sample characteristics.
The appropriate specification is an ordered probit: the depen-
dent variable takes the value 0 for no preference reversal, 1 for
weak preference reversal and 2 for strong preference reversal. The
principal regressions are reported in Tables 12—14.
Table 12 gives the estimates for the whole sample; the four
columns correspond to the four main equation specifications and
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the entries in small type are robust standard errors. Variables
included in each specification are as follows:
1. Personal characteristics (age in years; female, a dummy) ,
questionnaire-design features including design type ( d1, a
dummy) and level of BNI (c5, a dummy) and choices on
question 1 ( A and B are dummies)15
2. As in 1 but also country indicator of subsample.16
3. As in 1 but also institution indicator of subsample.17
4. As in 2 but also subject studied.18
15The case “indiﬀerent” is the omitted variable.
16Dummies for uruguay, israel, germany, us, fiji; UK is the omitted
case.
17Dummies for uruguay, fiji, ruppin (Ruppin Institute), bar (Bar-Ilan),
haifa, bonn, eastc (East Carolina), cornell; LSE is the omitted case.
18Dummies for econ, biz (business studies), socpol (social policy), eng
(engineering), math.
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Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4
age -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
female 0.019 0.014 0.0001 0.029
0.102 0.101 0.100 0.098
c5 -0.002 -0.025 -0.028 -0.042
0.068 0.070 0.070 0.066
d1 -0.098 -0.098 -0.075 -0.065
0.091 0.131 0.215 0.141
A -0.611** -0.569** -0.548** -0.553**
0.215 0.260 0.263 0.263
B 0.312*** 0.364*** 0.376*** 0.393***
0.072 0.064 0.062 0.058
uruguay -0.125 -0.160 0.043
0.214 0.265 0.144
israel 0.082 0.073
0.151 0.102
germany 0.19* 0.236**
0.111 0.114
us 0.070 -0.070
0.132 0.154
fiji 0.207 0.178 0.161
0.173 0.230 0.155
...continued
It is clear that in each of these specifications the overwhelm-
ingly important determinant of preference reversals is the set of
personal values that determine the choice on question 1. Curiously
studying mathematics predisposes people towards preference re-
versals while studying social policy or engineering19 predisposes
them in the opposite direction.
To get some further insight on the determinants of preference
reversals examine the estimates for the two subsamples respond-
ing “A” and “B” in question 1 — see Tables 13 and 14 respectively.
19Mathematics students were from University of South Pacific, Fiji; Social
policy students were from LSE; engineering students were from Uruguay.
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...continued
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4
ruppin 0.037
0.157
bar -0.126
0.199
haifa 0.205
0.209
bonn 0.188*
0.113
eastc 0.131
0.112
cornell -0.430*
0.247
econ 0.052
0.166
biz 0.337
0.228
socpol -0.481***
0.144
eng -0.406***
0.150
math 0.536***
0.164
Robust standard errors ad justed for clustering on universities
* signifi cant at 10% level; ** sign ifi cant at 5% ;, *** signifi cant at 1%
Table 12: Ordered Probit - All observations, N=1190
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age 0.010 0.020 -0.009 -0.004
0.015 0.017 0.007 0.008
female 0.114 0.081 0.008 -0.001
0.116 0.100 0.134 0.128
c5 -0.112 -0.130 -0.054 -0.189
0.189 0.179 0.231 0.165
d1 0.072 -0.227 0.076 -0.386
0.349 0.384 0.302 0.271
uruguay -0.633 -0.323 0.513
0.411 0.437 0.545
israel -0.967*** 0.136
0.169 0.438
germany -0.601*** -0.608
0.082 0.435
us -0.368***
0.088
fiji -0.208 0.116 1.126**
0.340 0.361 0.514
ruppin -1.014***
0.185
bar -0.868**
0.371
haifa 0.222
0.353
bonn -0.599***
0.077
eastc -0.310***
0.068
econ -0.639** -1.003***
0.287 0.326
biz -0.267 -0.486
0.278 0.442
eng -0.109 -0.336
0.261 0.402
math 1.312*** 0.666
0.337 0.490
Robust standard errors ad justed for clustering on universities
* signifi cant at 10% level; ** sign ifi cant at 5% ;, *** signifi cant at 1%
Table 13: Ordered Probit - Those responding A: N=283
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age -0.009 -0.011 -0.004 -0.007
0.014 0.016 0.011 0.012
female -0.010 -0.006 0.043 0.069
0.158 0.157 0.154 0.157
c5 -0.013 -0.016 -0.053 -0.016
0.097 0.096 0.094 0.100
d1 -0.198 -0.056 -0.176 0.023
0.304 0.501 0.153 0.299
uruguay 0.083 -0.048 0.225
0.374 0.541 0.307
israel 0.346*** 0.246
0.129 0.183
germany 0.317*** 0.672**
0.096 0.272
us 0.121 0.055
0.121 0.247
fiji 0.257 0.119 -0.086
0.337 0.517 0.362
ruppin 0.339**
0.133
bar 0.121
0.516
haifa 0.032
0.499
bonn 0.320***
0.096
eastc 0.165*
0.099
cornell -0.257
0.514
econ 0.260* 0.482*
0.151 0.275
biz 0.252 0.646
0.215 0.418
socpol -0.531*** -0.078
0.177 0.282
eng -0.379** -0.358**
0.150 0.177
math 0.520* 0.917***
0.266 0.329
Table 14: Ordered Probit - Those responding B: N=723
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Clearly some country variables (and the corresponding institution
indicators are now important) — for example the B-preferring re-
spondents from Israel and Germany subsamples are predisposed
towards preference reversals while the A-preferring respondents
are predisposed in the opposite direction; similar remarks apply
to the US. Economists in the A-responding subgroup are less pre-
disposed to preference reversals.20
Some might argue that to include all observations in the esti-
mation — including those who violated monotonicity by “pricing”
Gammaland above h or below l — is inappropriate. We reran the
equations reported in Tables 12—14 on a restricted sample that
excluded all responses where x < l or x > h on question 2 or 3.
The results from these regressions show little diﬀerence from those
on the full sample: the coeﬃcient on age is now significant and
negative for the full sample and for the A-subsample — as people
get older they tend to be less prone to preference reversal.
Two eﬀects are remarkable by their absence from any of their
regressions — either on the full sample or the A-responding or B-
responding subsamples, or from the restricted subsamples. Nowhere
does the design of the questionnaire (captured by the d1 dummy)
or BNI (captured by the c5 dummy) have an eﬀect on the proba-
bility of exhibiting a preference reversals. There is no evidence of
a framing eﬀect in this context.
5 Discussion
Why does one get preference reversals in the income-distribution
context? In this section we provide some remarks to compare the
phenomena reported here with what is known from the literature
explaining preference reversals in the risk context, as discussed in
section 1.
1. Income and endowment eﬀects. These are not relevant to the
present case. Throughout each version of the questionnaire
experiment there is the same notional starting point.
20Some dummies have been dropped because of problems of multicollinear-
ity — this accounts for the absence of cornell and socpol from Table 13
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2. Intransitive preferences. Given the simple structure of our
questionnaire it is unclear that this has a role to play in the
present case (Fishburn 1985). Furthermore, although Regret
Theory allows for intransitivity of preferences, it does not
appear to be relevant to our problem.
3. Framing Eﬀect. In order to control for this we used two
diﬀerent versions in our questionnaire. However the data
reveal no evidence of such a framing eﬀect.
4. Complexity. It is known from the conventional preference-
reversal literature that when the probabilities of the lotteries
involved are displayed in a less comprehensible format for the
subjects, this causes an underpricing of the P-bet (Johnson
et al. 1988, Seidl 2002). This appears to be relevant in the
case of the Gammaland-Betaland case in our experiments
too.
5. Anchoring. As noted in section 1.2 the anchoring phenom-
enon might cause violation of the independence axiom. The
basic needs income level serves as an anchor in our income
distribution problem. But it is clear from our control for the
two levels of BNI that this eﬀect does not play a significant
role in the pattern of responses.
6. Overpricing. Violation of first-order dominance could have
been just an ordering eﬀect in design 1, but it persists in
design 2. In the risk context such violations mean that the
amount they want to pay for a gamble with a maximum
payoﬀ of x is greater than or equal to x: sometimes over-
pricing the $ bet causes subjects to put a price higher than
the maximum in the alternative. Since the subjects’ answer
is in monetary terms, they respond more readily to the $ bet
than to the P bet. This appears to be relevant as an expla-
nation in our case too — particularly in the case of Israeli
respondents who chose Alfaland. We may have the welfare-
economic counterpart of the failure of procedure invariance
discussed by Tversky et al. (1990).
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6 Conclusion
The parallels between PR in their “natural habitat” of individual
risk preference and in the welfare-theoretic analysis of income dis-
tribution are striking. We might go further and say that we could
have expected PR to be less of a problem in the present context
than in the case of risk. The statement “70% of the people have
an income of 10 Groats, the remaining 30% get 100 Groats” may
seems to be less abstract than the statement “There is a probabil-
ity of 0.7 that you will get 10 Groats and a probability of 0.3 that
you will get 100 Groats”. People can have diﬃculty in understand-
ing what probabilities are, but we may hope that they know well
enough what a fraction is. Of course probabilities can be trans-
lated into fractions, but this involves a counterfactual and is thus
rather a diﬃcult exercise. This makes the presence of PR in the
social-welfare and income distribution context rather remarkable.
Preference reversals appear as a kind of “dysfunction” in the
theory of choice under uncertainty. The same could be said about
our application to social choice amongst income distributions too.
However it is a dysfunction that has potentially profound impli-
cations in two areas.
First, it aﬀects thinking about economic policy toward income
distribution. An attempt to deduce the public’s willingness to
trade oﬀ, say, overall income for greater equality is likely to be
dramatically aﬀected by the way in which the notional choice is
presented.
Second there are further implications for the formal analysis of
social welfare. As in previous studies we have found evidence of
violations monotonicity that, in turn, implies violations of dom-
inance criteria. However, there is something more. If preference
reversals are important then the concept of a well-defined, unique
equally-distributed equivalent income may no longer be valid.
@@
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A Questionnaires
Following are the two designs of the questionnaire used in the
experiments reported in the main text.
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Design 1 
Income Distribution Questionnaire 
 
1. The percapita income of 70% of the citizens of Alphaland is 10 Groats, and 
the per capita income of the remaining 30% is 100 Groats. In Betaland 20% 
of the citizens have a percapita income of 10 Groats, while the other 80% 
have a percapita income of 30 Groats. In each country the income that 
secures a supply of basic needs is 5 Groats. You are the leader of a small 
community that is considering a political union with one of the two countries. 
You expect that after the union the distribution of income in your small 
community will be the same as in the country you have joined. What would 
you decide? Please check (✔) one… 
Definitely join 
Alfaland 
 Definitely join 
Betaland
 Toss a coin 
to decide…  
 
 
 
2. As before the percapita income of 70% of the citizens of Alphaland is 10 
Groats, and the percapita income of the remaining 30% is 100 Groats. In 
Gammaland all citizens have equal per capita income. In each country the 
basic-needs income level is 5 Groats. In your opinion, what is the minimum 
percapita income in Gammaland to ensure that the population would be 
better off in Gammaland than in Alphaland?  
_________ Groats 
 
 
3. Assume that all the data in questions 1 and 2 remain unchanged. In your 
opinion, what is the minimum percapita income in Gammaland to ensure that 
the population would be better off in Gammaland than in Betaland? 
_________ Groats 
 
 
Finally, we would be grateful for some information about yourself: 
 
• Are you male or female? M/F 
• What is your age?   _____ years 
• What is your special subject? __________ 
• In which year are you? __________ 
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Design 2 
Income Distribution Questionnaire 
 
1. The percapita income of 70% of the citizens of Alfaland is 10 Groats, and the 
percapita income of the remaining 30% is 100 Groats. In Betaland 20% of 
the citizens have a percapita income of 10 Groats, while the other 80% have 
a percapita income of 30 Groats. In each country the income that secures a 
supply of basic needs is 5 Groats (see table below). You are the leader of a 
small community that is considering a political union with one of the two 
countries. You expect that after the union the distribution of income in your 
small community will be the same as in the country you have joined. What 
would you decide? Please check (✔) one… 
Definitely join 
Alfaland 
 Definitely join 
Betaland
 Toss a coin 
to decide…  
 
Alfaland Betaland 
70% 10 Groats 20% 10 Groats 
30% 100 Groats 80% 30 Groats 
    
needs level = 5 Groats needs level = 5 Groats 
 
 
 
2. In Gammaland all citizens have the same per capita income and again the 
basic-needs income level is 5 Groats. In your opinion, what is the minimum 
percapita income in Gammaland that would persuade you to move to 
Gammaland rather than Betaland? (See the income distribution for Betaland 
in the box above) 
_________ Groats 
 
3. In your opinion, what is the minimum percapita income in Gammaland that 
would persuade you to move to Gammaland rather than Alfaland? (See the 
income distribution for Alfaland in the box above) 
_________ Groats 
 
 
Finally, we would be grateful for some information about yourself: 
 
• Are you male or female? M/F 
• What is your age?   _____ years 
• What is your special subject? __________ 
• In which year are you? __________ 
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